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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that, in order to
safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, police
must inform suspects of their “Miranda rights” when subjecting them to
custodial interrogations.1 Courts normally determine custody for Miranda
purposes by asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.2
But what happens when suspects are in prison and cannot leave? When is
someone who is in custody “in custody”? That is a question that the
Supreme Court has explicitly refused to answer, until now.3
Recently, in Howes v. Fields, the Sixth Circuit took a bright line
approach to defining “custody” in custodial settings, ruling that when
police separate inmates from the general population and question them
regarding an incident occurring outside the prison, the inmate is per se “in
custody” for the purposes of Miranda.4
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Sixth
Circuit’s holding in Howes v. Fields and create a bright line rule requiring
law enforcement to read inmates their Miranda rights when police move
inmates from the general population and isolate them for the purpose of
interrogating them regarding a crime that occurred outside the prison. Part
II of this Note examines the application of Miranda in custodial settings
and explores the circuit split created by Fields.5 Part III argues that the
Court should affirm the Fields holding because separating inmates from the
general population satisfies the coercive pressure and restraint on
movement requirements necessary to trigger Miranda protections.6
Finally, Part IV concludes that the bright line rule articulated in Fields is
necessary to safeguard the rights of inmates and should be affirmed in
1. See 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that statements taken during a
custodial interrogation are inadmissible to establish guilt unless the accused was
provided a full and effective warning of their rights and then knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waived those rights).
2. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995) (holding that the
reasonable person analysis in determining custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed
question of law and fact and qualifies for independent habeas review).
3. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990) (noting that custody alone
may not always require a warning but refusing to visit the issue).
4. See Howes v. Fields, 617 F.3d 813, 823 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 1047 (Jan. 24, 2011) (No. 10-680).
5. See infra Part II (describing the cases interpreting Miranda custody issues in a
custodial setting).
6. See infra Part III (arguing that Fields was correctly decided under Maryland v.
Shatzer).
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order to provide more guidance to the courts.7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Miranda, Mathis, and More.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”8 The writers of the
Constitution included the Fifth Amendment in order to protect against the
exercise of arbitrary power and guard against an inquisitorial system of
justice.9 But safeguarding the constitutional rights of citizens against
overzealous police requires additional prophylactic measures; so, the
Supreme Court endeavored, beginning with Escobedo v. Illinois, to ensure
that the rights given by the Constitution did not become merely a “form of
words.”10
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court proclaimed that the constitutionally
founded privilege against self-incrimination was, and had always been, “as
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”11 The Court
explained that any safeguards and constitutional principles would be
“empty formalities” if the police could simply undermine citizens’ free
wills and compel them to speak against themselves.12 In order to safeguard
the rights of suspects, the Court in Miranda devised a system of warnings
that police are required to read to suspects whom police interrogate in
custody.13
When police inform suspects of their Miranda rights, it empowers the
suspects with the knowledge that their interrogators are prepared and
required by law to recognize their rights, as well as warns suspects of the
severity of the situation and the consequences of waiving their rights.14
These periphery functions of Miranda warnings are so important that the
7. See infra Part IV (concluding that the Supreme Court should adopt the Sixth
Circuit's bright line rule).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See generally Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896) (detailing the
common law roots of the Fifth Amendment).
10. See 378 U.S. 478, 480 (1964) (acknowledging that the Sixth Amendment is
extended to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 439, 459 (1966) (identifying the requirement
that the government treat its citizens with dignity and integrity as the foundation for the
adversarial processes).
12. See id. at 471 (concluding that a warning is an “absolute prerequisite” in
overcoming the inherent pressures of an interrogation atmosphere).
13. See id. at 470-74 (establishing that police must inform suspects of their right to
remain silent, the consequences of waiving it, their right to an attorney, and, if indigent,
their right to have an attorney provided to them).
14. See id. at 468-69 (describing how procedural safeguards require that when
suspects invoke their rights they will be “scrupulously honored”).
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Court stated that circumstantial evidence of a suspect’s subjective
knowledge of her rights, no matter how great, cannot replace Miranda
warnings.15 While some subsequent cases considered a suspect’s objective
reasonableness in defining custody, Miranda requires safeguards any time
the Fifth Amendment is in jeopardy.16
The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether police were required
to read an inmate his Miranda rights in Mathis v. United States.17 The
inmate was serving a state prison sentence when a government agent
questioned him regarding his tax returns.18 The government argued that
because the officers who interrogated the inmate were not the officers who
put him in custody and that there was no link between the custody and
interrogation, the coercive pressures that Miranda sought to guard against
were not present, and therefore, it did not entitle the inmate to hear his
Miranda rights.19 The Court concluded that the distinctions that the
government was drawing were “too minor and shadowy” to excuse the
police from the prophylactic measures extended to suspects “held in
custody.”20
B. Sixth Circuit in the Out Fields
1. Cervantes and the Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit, in Cervantes v. Walker, was the first circuit court to
consider whether Mathis created a bright line rule regarding an inmate’s
Miranda rights.21 In the case, an inmate was switching cells after a
physical altercation with another inmate.22 Before being moved, a
corrections officer directed the inmate to gather his belongings and took

15. See id. at 471-72 (realizing that suspects must understand the consequences of
waiving their rights in order to appreciate and intelligently exercise them).
16. See id. at 478; see also Berkmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (applying an
objective reasonableness standard in determining custody); California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121 (1983) (finding that the ultimate determination for custody is whether there
is a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest).
17. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (rejecting the argument that
Miranda did not apply because there was no relationship between the interrogation and
the reason for custody).
18. See id. at 3 (rejecting the argument that tax investigations are immune from
Miranda requirements).
19. See id. at 4 (dismissing the argument that the questions posed were part of a
routine tax investigation and did not amount to an interrogation).
20. See id. at 2 (emphasis added) (declining to “narrow” the scope of Miranda to
cases where the reason the person is being interrogated is related to the reason they are
in custody).
21. See 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978) (requiring that an inmate’s freedom of
movement be further diminished for Miranda to apply).
22. Id. at 426.
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him to the prison library to wait for the shift commander.23 However, after
the corrections officer found marijuana during the routine search of the
inmate’s belongings, he went into the library and questioned the inmate,
who immediately made an incriminating statement.24
The Ninth Circuit differentiated between on-the-scene questioning and
questioning in a traditional custodial setting, ultimately holding that Mathis
was not broad enough to deem all questioning in a jail or prison to be per se
in custody.25 Instead, the court substituted a totality of the circumstances
test in determining whether a reasonable person would believe that there
had been “a restriction of his freedom over and above that in his normal
prisoner setting.”26
Several Circuits have followed Cervantes in defining custody where the
basis of the interrogation is a crime occurring on the prison premises.27
Some courts have gone further, extending Cervantes to cases where the
subject of the interrogation was a crime arising outside of the prison, such
as in United States v. Menzer.28 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
inmate was not in custody because the inmate knew the substance of the
interrogation ahead of time, attended the interrogation voluntarily, did not
have added physical restraints imposed on him, and was told that he could
leave.29 In total, seven circuits have applied the holding in Cervantes or
explicitly adopted a totality of the circumstances test.
2. Maryland v. Shatzer
The Supreme Court, in Edwards v. Arizona, held that under Miranda,
23. But see id. at 429 (Blaine, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the interview in the
library was intended as interrogation regarding the earlier altercation and rejecting the
majorities holding).
24. See id. at 417 (majority opinion) (noting that the corrections officer only asked
the inmate one question before the inmate incriminated himself).
25. See id. at 428 (rejecting a broad interpretation of Mathis as disrupting prison
administration and investigations).
26. See id. (articulating the four factors as: (1) the language used in summoning the
inmate; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the
inmate is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) any additional pressures exerted
to detain him).
27. See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that
when the corrections officer took an inmate to a conference room primarily to await
medical treatment, the inmate was not in custody); United States v. Chamberlain, 163
F.3d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th
Cir. 1990)) (developing a totality of the circumstances test based on the six factors set
out in United States v. Griffin).
28. See 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring an added imposition on the
inmate’s freedom of movement or compulsion above and beyond imprisonment for
Miranda to apply).
29. Id. at 1232 (embracing the prison’s registrar’s testimony that interviews were
optional); accord Georgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
inmate was not in custody because the police did not impose additional restrictions, the
inmate agreed to the meeting, and the interrogation occurred in the visiting room).
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statements made as a result of police interrogation are presumed
involuntary, and therefore, inadmissible when elicited after a suspect
invokes his right to an attorney.30 The Supreme Court in Shatzer
considered whether Edwards barred the admission of an inmate defendant’s
incriminating statements when the inmate invoked his right to an attorney
under Miranda two and a half years before the interrogation, where he
made the incriminating statements.31 After creating a fourteen-day “break
in custody” exception to the Edwards bar on police interrogation, the Court
instructed that, in applying Edwards, courts must first determine whether
the suspect was in Miranda-custody in order to trigger the Edwards
protections, and then simply repeat that inquiry for the time between
interrogations.32 The Court applied this new test and concluded that
Shatzer was in custody during all three of his interrogations, but not while
he was in the general prison population.33
3. Howes v. Fields
Fields was being held for disorderly conduct when a corrections officer,
without informing Fields of where he was being taken or for what purpose,
escorted him from his jail cell to a locked conference room, where two
officers questioned him for approximately seven hours regarding an
unrelated allegation occurring outside the prison.34 During those seven
hours, the police did not inform Mr. Fields of his Miranda rights, but did
tell him that if he did not want to cooperate he was “free to leave the
conference room at any time.”35 Mr. Fields did not ask for an attorney or to
go back to his cell; however, he repeatedly told the officers that he did not
want to speak with them anymore.36 While Mr. Fields initially denied the
allegations, he eventually gave an incriminating statement, which the trial
court later refused to suppress on Miranda grounds.37
30. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
31. See 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010) (creating a “break in custody” exception to

Edwards once a suspect is out of custody for fourteen days, reasoning that all coercive
effects would sufficiently dissipate in two weeks).
32. See id. at 1224-25 (speculating that the subsequent detention of inmates in the
general prison population is “relatively disconnected” from any potential prior
unwillingness to cooperate with an investigation).
33. See id. at 1224 (explaining that while all forms of incarceration meet the
restriction on freedom of movement element of custody, that condition alone is not
sufficient to trigger Miranda protections).
34. See People v. Fields, No. 246041, 2004 WL 979732, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May
6, 2004) (noting that the interview began around eight or nine in the evening, but did
not end until around midnight), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1047 (Jan. 24, 2011) (No. 10680).
35. See id. (noting that Mr. Fields was being held for an unrelated domestic
assault).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Simpson and Fields Properly Held that an Inmate Removed from
General Population and Isolated for the Purposes of an Interrogation
Regarding a Crime Occurring Outside the Prison Is in Custody for
Miranda Purposes Because the Situation Is Inherently Coercive.
Mathis and Fields are factually indistinguishable because the police in
both cases interrogated isolated inmates about crimes occurring outside the
prison, so it follows that both defendants were in custody for Miranda
purposes.38 While the facts of Mathis lend support to the holding and
bright line rule applied in Fields, Mathis did not explicitly define or create
a rule for defining custody in a prison setting; therefore, the controlling
precedent for defining custody is Miranda.39 Miranda requires a two-step
inquiry in determining custody. First, there must be a restraint on the
suspect’s freedom of movement. Second, there must be the presence of
coercive pressures. Both of these elements existed during the seven-hour
interrogation of Mr. Fields.
1. Incarceration Satisfies the Restraint on Freedom of Movement
Necessary for Miranda to Apply, and No Additional Restraint on Movement
is Necessary.
Incarceration satisfies the restraint on movement test because, even in
lowest level security prisons, inmates cannot leave without permission.
While many inmates may make phone calls, write letters, and even receive
visitors, they are essentially cut off from the outside word. Shatzer clearly
states that all forms of incarceration meet the restraint on freedom of
movement test.40
Some courts have required additional restraints on the freedom of
movement of inmates in order to meet this element of custody.41 Those
courts are attempting to follow the reasoning in cases taking place outside
of a custodial setting, which look at how an objective reasonable person
might feel in a given situation.42 But that inquiry is irrelevant in a prison
setting, and that line of reasoning is flawed because the environment
Miranda guards against is blaringly present; interrogation of incarcerated
38. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (failing to distinguish custody
as an inmate generally versus custody upon isolation).
39. See id. at 4 (deferring to Miranda for the definition of custody).
40. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (explaining that an
expansion of Edwards would not decrease wrongful convictions).
41. See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978) (requiring a
restriction of freedom above and over that of an inmate’s normal prison setting).
42. See Gorgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Berkmer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)) (applying an objective reasonableness test).
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persons results in an incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police dominated setting. Miranda’s preoccupation with secrecy and
privacy is not based on subjective or objective measures, but flowed from
the reasoning that privacy results in secrecy that in turn produces a gap of
knowledge as to what police do in interrogation rooms, and the danger that
they may arbitrarily use or abuse their power.43 While inmates are not
isolated from the public at all times, the reality of prison life lends itself to
the danger of police misconduct, and consequently, incarceration alone
meets the freedom of movement requirement.44
2. The Isolation of an Inmate from the General Population for the
Purpose of an Interrogation Regarding a Crime Occurring Outside the
Prison Satisfies the Coercive Pressure Necessary for Miranda to Apply.
Fields does not hold that inmates are in custody at all times, but instead,
identifies one circumstance where the atmosphere is so clearly coercive
that a bright line rule is necessary to ensure the protection of Fifth
Amendment rights. Removing an inmate from the general prison
population for the purpose of an interrogation immediately transforms the
restrictive nature of incarceration into a coercive one. Since correction
officers regulate inmates’ day-to-day activities, further isolation multiplies
the coercive effect. When police initially take a suspect into custody, there
are usually third parties that know about the suspect’s predicament, and
regardless of whether they are interested or able to help, the custody is not
a secret. Conversely, in a custodial setting, it is possible that no one other
than the inmate and the interrogators know what is happening. Not only is
the inmate prevented from reaching out to friends or family, but also, the
public is altogether unaware of the situation.45
The coercive effect of this police-dominated, incommunicado
interrogation does not dissipate simply because an inmate is familiar with
his surroundings.46 Additionally, since corrections officers regulate all
aspects of prisoners’ lives, it is reasonable for inmates to believe that their
cooperation with an interrogation may directly and immediately adversely
affect them, whether or not their interrogators have any power over their
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (citing police manuals that
maintain that isolation is the principal psychological method of interrogation).
44. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct at 1233 (Souter, J., concurring) (pointing out the
troubling circumstances that police could exploit such as no need for formal arrest).
45. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463 (recognizing that the compulsion to speak is
heightened in a police station as compared to in the courts or other official
investigations where there may be impartial observers to guard against intimidation and
trickery).
46. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (holding that a suspect was in
custody in his own home despite his comfort and familiarity with the surroundings
because of the coercive, incommunicado, and police dominated atmosphere).
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fate.47 In fact, an inmate’s cooperation may be considered when
determining parole.48 Because inmates are uniquely vulnerable to the
actions of corrections officers, who cooperate with police officers and other
interrogators, the coercive atmosphere is more severe regardless of who is
doing the interrogating.49 In Fields a corrections officer escorted the
suspect to an isolated area without informing him where he was taking him
or why, furthering the appearance that the interrogator was either in control
and did not inform the corrections officer of the situation, or that the two
were working together against the suspect.50
Interviewing incarcerated suspects allows police officers more freedom
in their investigation than they have with suspects living in the community.
Police can interview incarcerated suspects whenever they want without
having reasonable suspicion to stop them or probable cause to formally
arrest or hold them.51 Accordingly, police do not need to finish
investigations in a timely manner, thus avoiding the protections triggered
by formal proceedings.52 This lack of protection for inmates, and potential
for abuse, further demonstrates the danger and coercive nature of isolated
interrogations in custodial settings and highlights the need for prophylactic
measures.53
3. Telling an Inmate He is Free to Leave Does Not Negate the Coercive
Nature of an Interrogation, and is Not a Sufficient Substitute for Miranda
Warnings.
While some courts have considered whether interrogators told inmates
they were allowed to leave in determining if those inmates were in custody
for Miranda purposes, such an instruction does not negate coerciveness.54
47. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct at 1220 (acknowledging that compulsion is likely when
there is the “appearance” that the interrogators may control an inmate’s fate).
48. See MD. CODE REGS. 12.08.01.18(A)(3) (1995).
49. See Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to assess the
credibility of the inmate who denied initiating contact with the police-interrogator and
claimed that he was told by a corrections officer that if he refused to go, he would be
handcuffed and taken to the interview room).
50. Cf. United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering
the fact that the suspect knew the subject of the interrogation, including a list of
questions to be addressed in deciding that he was not in custody during the
interrogation).
51. Cf. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct at 1218 (noting the defendants surprise in response to the
interrogation since police had closed the case two and a half years earlier).
52. See Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring that if a
suspect is arrested without predetermined probable cause, they have the right to be
arraigned within forty-eight hours of their arrest).
53. Cf. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct at 1217 (observing that during the suspect’s first
interrogation, he was confused and was under the impression that the interrogator was
an attorney appointed to help him in his current case).
54. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966) (observing how police
psychologically condition suspects by creating the allusion of fairness).
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Because inmates by the very nature of their incarceration have gone
through the criminal justice system, an assumption that inmates know their
rights would eliminate Miranda in prisons all together.55 Additionally,
Miranda specifically described interrogation techniques where police tell
suspects that they may leave or remain silent as a method for cajoling
confessions.56 Consequently, the claim that interrogators told inmates that
they were free to leave only lends support to the claim that Miranda applies
and that prophylactic measures are necessary to safeguard the rights of
prisoners. In Fields, the claim that the atmosphere was not coercive due to
the officer telling the suspect that he was free to leave is unsupported, if not
entirely contradicted, by the fact that the police did not scrupulously honor
the suspects repeated request to be left alone as would have been required
by Miranda.57
Miranda rights also protect against coercion by orienting suspects to the
severity of their circumstances and assuring them that their interrogators
are required to abide by the law, neither of which is accomplished by
telling inmates they may leave the interrogation.58 The inmate in Shatzer
waived his Miranda rights while under the impression that his interrogator
was his attorney, but upon learning otherwise quickly invoked the rights’
protection—something he may not have been able to do if the officer did
not read them to him. Accordingly, because of the uniquely vulnerable
circumstances that inmates face, as outlined above, only Miranda rights
would be sufficient to safeguard the rights of inmates who are isolated for
the purposes of interrogation.
B. The Supreme Court Should Affirm the Bright Line Approach in Fields
Because it will Provide Lower Courts Direction in Applying Miranda in
Custodial Settings.
The Ninth Circuit, in Cervantes, reasoned that in order to reconcile
Mathis with Miranda, an additional restriction on freedom was required
and further extrapolated that a more liberal interpretation of Miranda
would “totally disrupt prison administration.”59 But the facts in Cervantes,
55. See id. at 478 (mandating Miranda warnings as an absolute prerequisite in
overcoming coercive pressure and discarding any evidence of the suspect’s knowledge
regarding their rights as irrelevant).
56. Id. at 454.
57. See People v. Fields, No. 246041, 2004 WL 979732, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May
6, 2004) (noting that the interview lasted about seven hours), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
1047 (Jan. 24, 2011) (No. 10-680)
58. But see Georgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2009) (rationalizing
that the inmate was not in custody since he refused to answer questions, ended the
interrogation, and left the visitor’s room).
59. See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978) (admitting that
Mathis narrowed the range of situations where on-the-scene-questioning in prisons was
precluded by Miranda).
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where the officer briefly questioned the inmate about marijuana he had
found moments before and steps away, are more parallel with an on-thescene investigation, explicitly excluded by Miranda.60
Respectively, the holding in Fields is neither adverse nor applicable to
Cervantes or similar cases where corrections officers immediately question
inmates about crimes occurring on prison grounds.61 Because Fields only
pertains to crimes occurring outside the prison and to instances when
inmates are isolated for the purpose of interrogation, the line of inquiry
required for resolving cases involving a crime committed within the prison
is outside the scope of the issue before the Supreme Court in this case.62
While Cervantes dealt with a crime occurring within the prison, some
courts applied its holding to crimes occurring outside the prison. The
Seventh Circuit, in Menzer, relied on Cervantes and Conley in concluding
that Miranda protections did not apply, but failed to distinguish Menzer,
even though Miranda would not disrupt prison administration in that
instance.63 In fact, Mathis, Shatzer, Fields, Donelli, and Menzer, all
involve officers isolating an inmate for the purposes of interrogating them
about a crime occurring outside the prison; but, Menzer and Donelli are the
only cases to conclude that the suspects were not in custody.64 The Second
Circuit, in Donelli, emphasized that the corrections officer first asked the
inmate whether he was willing to speak to detectives, but failed to examine
the relationship between the inmate and the corrections officer and the
coercive objective appearance described above.65
IV. CONCLUSION
The reading of Miranda rights is more than just an empty formality; it
informs interrogated persons not only of their rights, but also that if ever
they wished to exercise those rights, that time is now. The attenuated

60. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (excluding on-the-scene-questioning in order not
to hamper police investigations where the suspects were not “under restraint”).
61. See Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1491 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that
when the corrections officer, immediately after extinguishing a fire in the inmates cell,
asked the inmate why he set the fire, the inmate was not in custody).
62. Compare United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that an
inmate was not in custody when officers took him into the conference room to await
medical treatment), with United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 1998)
(applying a totality of the circumstances test in determining custody different than the
one articulated in Cervantes and concluding the inmate was in custody).
63. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231 (misconstruing a bright line
rule as providing more protections to inmates than people in the public).
64. See also Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that
because the inmate instigated communication with police regarding the crime in
question the atmosphere was not coercive).
65. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010) (noting that the inmate
assented to the second and third requests for interviews).
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distinctions trending away from Mathis that some cases have attempted to
draw are too “minor and shadowy.” While Fields leaves some questions
open—such as the definition of “custody” in custodial settings—the Sixth
Circuit’s bright line rule clarifies a common circumstance where police
should read inmates their Miranda rights and clarifies the remaining issue
of on-the-scene interrogations within the prison. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court should affirm Fields and create a bright line rule requiring police to
read inmates their Miranda rights when police isolate them for the purposes
of interrogating them regarding a crime that occurred outside the prison.
Doing so would breathe new life into Miranda, provide guidance to the
lower courts, and temper some of the mischief the Fifth Amendment was
specifically designed to guard against.

